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Jloobtaking anb ~eacemaking
Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland
William Ian Miller
In his newest book, published by University of Chicago Press in August, Professor
Miller continues to throw open the world of Old Norse studies to interested readers,
delving beneath the Vikings' world of brutality and chaos to expose a deeper struggle
for social equilibrium. His examination of ancient Iceland's sagas and legal code
sheds light on the society that produced them and reveals how the culture of the feud,
central to this stateless society, was driven by the related norms of honor, reciprocity
and balance.
The selections that follow are from the prologue and conclusion of Bloodtaking and
Peacemaking.
"~be ~aga

of ~krering 1E.Jroalb!i!ion" (~art 3J)

krering Hroaldsson is an exceedingly
minor character in the saga world. He figures briefly in two incidents, each recounted
in a different saga. Part I of his story is
found in Gudmundar saga dyra (The Saga of
Gudmund the Worthy), a saga recounting local disputes in the Eyjafjord district in the
north of Iceland during the last decade of the
twelfth century. It is in the last chapter of
this saga that Skrering is introduced, his tale
providing the epilogue to Gudmund's saga.
Skrering, we are told, had been consecrated
a deacon; he was also a kinsman of Gudmund. I quote the source:
Some Norwegian merchants chopped off Skrering 's hand. Gudmund dyri was
given self-judgment in the injury case. Haf Brandsson [Gudmund's second
cousin] and Gudmund together adjudged compensation in the amount of thirty
hundreds, which was to be paid over immediately. Gudmund then rode away
from the ship.
But the Norwegians confronted Haf, who had remained behind; they thought
the judgment had been too steep and they asked him to do one of two things:
either reduce the award or swear an oath.
Haf refused to do either.
Some people rode after Gudmund and told him what had happened. He turned
back immediately and asked Haf what was going on.
Excerpted from Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland by
William Ian Miller, by arrangement with the University of Chicago Press. © 1990 by the
University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved.
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Haf told him where matters stood.
Gudmund said, "Swear the oath, Haf, or else I will do it, but then they will
have to pay sixty hundreds. The oath of either one of us will have the same price
as Skrering's hand."
The Norwegians refused the offer.
"Then I shall make you another proposal," said Gudmund. "I will pay
Skrering the thirty hundreds that you were judged to pay, but I shall choose one
man from amongst you who seems to me of equivalent standing with Skrering
and chop off his hand. You may then compensate that man's hand as cheaply as
you wish."
This did not appeal to the Norwegians and they decided to pay the original
award immediately. Gudmund took Skrering with him when they left the ship.
(G.dyri 26:212)
The scene takes place at shipside where Norwegian merchants would live during the
summer months and Icelanders would come to trade. The setting allows us to speculate
that the reason Skrering lost his hand had its origins in suspected cheating or thieving.
But the origins of Skrering's misfortune are of no special interest to either the narrator
or his characters. The account has something of the style of an exemplum and what is
important is the existence of a claim to resolve; not how that claim came into being.
By the time the saga writer focuses attention on this incident it is not the hand that is
the subject of the dispute but the legitimacy and justice of Gudmund's judgment. The
Norwegians think the award excessive, and not without reason. More than a few men's
lives at this time were compensated for with thirty hundreds or less .... Gudmund,
however, is able to justify astutely his over-reaching by giving these men of the market
a lesson on the contingency of value and values. To the Norwegians the award should
reflect the price of a middling Icelandic hand. Gudmund forces them to conceive of the
award in a different way: it is not the price of buying Skrering's hand, but the price of
preserving a Norwegian hand. By introducing the prospect of one of their hands to balance against Skrering's, he is able to remind the Norwegians that the thirty hundreds
they must pay purchases more than Skrering's hand; it also buys off vengeance in kind .
He is also able to force them to take into account the costs of personalizing the injury.
Most people, he bets, are willing to pay more to save their own hands than they would
be willing to pay to take someone else's. The justice of Gudmund's award thus depends
on a redefinition of its significance. Rather than buying Skrering's hand, the Norwegians are preserving their own, and the price, they now feel, is well worth paying.
Fellow feeling thus comes not in the form of imagining Skrering's anguish and pain as
Skrering's, but in imagining the pain as their own. Gudmund is also able to humiliate
them in the process. He reveals them not only as cowards but as small-minded hagglers
unwilling to pay an award they bound themselves to pay when they gave Gudmund and
Haf the power to judge the case. Gudmund, after all, offers to fulfill his own judgment,
thereby making, in grand style, a disclaimer of his eagerness for money at the
expense of justice. By such indirection the saga writer and Gudmund bring us back to
Skrering 's misery, even if his misery must take a backseat to the display of Gudmund 's
virtuosity in the rhetoric of self-legitimation.
This little vignette serves as a reminder of the negotiability of significations, the
multiplicity of possible meanings extractable by people from any particular social setting. It also demonstrates that the forcefulness of rhetoric is more than just an internal
affair of language and signs; it is about power and violence. Much of Gudmund's wit,
clearly, depends on his ability to take a Norwegian hand whether they like it or not.
The account is dense with social, psychological, and dramatic possibility.... [But] to
those unfamiliar with early Iceland the story must be puzzling in many ways. In some
respects the case is not typical. The Norwegian presence is mostly responsible for that.
The dispute would not have unfolded exactly as it did if it only involved Icelanders....
In many ways, however, the case is typical or raises questions that involve typical
social and legal matters. Why, for instance, does the case fall to Gudmund? Was
Gudmund obliged to assist Skrering because they were kin? What is self-judgment?
Were all wrongs deemed compensable and, if so, how precisely was the balance
struck? Was it always a hand for a hand or were other factors more crucial? Who was

m:be account bas sometf]ing of tbe
stple of an exemplum anb tubat
is important is tbe existence of
a claim to resolbe, not bow tbat
claim came into being.
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obliged to compensate for harm? Did the source of the payment matter? ... To what
extent was liability individualized and to what extent was it vicarious? There is, for instance, no concern in this account to identify and punish the person who actually did
the amputation. Are all disputes subject to so much bargaining? What of rules, customs, and other norms? Were there none that governed this kind of encounter? If there
were ruled constraints, to what extent were they negotiable? Just what were the expectations of the parties when they met? How will Skrering requite Gudmund? And what
kind of life can Skrering, maimed, be expected to lead?
These are but a few of the questions suggested by the case. If they tend to be more
strictly legal than social, that is more a function of the content of an account rehearsing
the terms of an arbitrated settlement than of the special focus of [my inquiry], which is
distinctly social historical. A significant portion ... is about the disputing process in
medieval Iceland, about how contention was mediated socially, and about how that process impinged on the social solidarities of households, kin, and Thing attachment. This
necessarily involves a focus on obligation, on the types of claims people made on each
other, both on those they considered of their party and on those they felt hostile toward, and on how they admitted or avoided those claims made upon them. In short, the
focus is on the micropolitics of social interaction. "Disputes studies" has been in vogue
for nearly two decades among a wide spectrum of legal anthropologists, sociologists
of law, and even, lately, historians. I am deeply indebted to this literature, but a focus
on the process of dispute would have been thrust upon me even in the absence of the
vogue simply by virtue of the sources. The relevant written artifacts of medieval Iceland - sagas and laws - are about .. . the processing of disputes, bloodfeuds, and
the subtleties of maneuver in social interactions.
Nonspecialist readers will be surprised, I think, to find that many issues of more
general interest to sociologists, ·historians, legal scholars, and social and political theorists are raised in a more salient way in early Iceland than they are in medieval England
and the continent, of, for that matter, in many modern settings. Part of this is due to the
remarkable nature of the surviving sources, which allow us to reconstruct the forms
and style of face-to-face interaction and to observe the dynamics within and between
small groups (the saga writers of the thirteenth century anticipated the sensibility and
perspicacity of Erving Goffman). Part is due to the simpler state of Icelandic social
development when compared with most nonmountainous areas of Europe at the same
time. Medieval Iceland, until the end of the commonwealth, ca. 1262, was a society
without any coercive state apparatus; it had only a weak sense of lordship, yet at the
same time it had a highly developed legal system with courts and elaborate rules of
procedure and equally elaborate rules of substantive law. But there was no provision for
public enforcement of the law; it was up to the aggrieved party to see that his wrongs
were righted and execute the judgments he obtained on hi;> own behalf. This "private"
aspect of Icelandic social control and conflict resolution has already gotten the sagas
the attention of an occasional Chicago School economist, ever vigilant for real-life
examples of theoretical libertarian splendor (see, e.g., Friedman 1979).
Iceland's isolation gives us a society freer from outside impingements than most
other European cultures. Its disorders were systemic, not imposed. Isolation relieved
the society of the expense of defending against external threat: the North Atlantic was
both more effective and cheaper than a system of royal burgs. The objects of fear the inhospitable environment and the violence of one's own countrymen - were local
and familiar. There was also no native population that needed to be subjugated . The
land came to its new possessors unembarrassed with prior claims and too far removed
for many to entertain seriously making future claims. Partly for these reasons, Iceland
was blessed by an absence of a systematic exploitive lordship in the continental style
longer than would have been possible had foreign invasion been a real threat. Isolation
also delayed and stunted the growth of an exploitive church, although, as we shall see,
it was the system of funding the church that ultimately provided the apparatus for some
men to skim the production of their neighbors. In short, isolation gave the Icelanders
relief from some of the more oppressive social institutions of the continent. And
to some extent their relief is also mine, for underdeveloped lordship and a modest
church, coupled with the fact that this frontier culture was in no way molded by Roman

occupation and administration, made for a neater and cleaner subject than the usual
medieval fare. My themes will be uncomplicated by kings, counts, and monks. In
Iceland, we actually had a sedentary animal husbandry society, operating in a relative
vacuum, which took care to articulate laws and to develop a technique of narration of
its feuds and disorders that is the envy of most world literatures. It is as if the universe
designed an experiment to test the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau and was kind
enough to provide for the presence of intelligent and sophisticated observers, the
saga writers, to record the results.
I am primarily interested in social structures and social processes; but I am also in
search of the sensibilities of the people who populate the sources. The sagas allow us
to observe people living their lives at various levels of competence as they attempt to
negotiate and manipulate the possibilities that inhere in the tangle of social networks.
The historian is able to discern certain patterns in practical experience of which the natives too, at some level, were not unaware. We can see, for instance, that the Icelanders
understood that arbitration was a likely outcome for certain categories of disputes. But
the fact that we can, or they could, see pattern or structure at the conclusion of a dispute does not mean that an outcome conforming to the structure was foreordained.
There were choices to be made along the route that could delay or rush events to their
anticipated conclusion, the very change in the pacing of the events altering both their
significance and who ultimately benefited or suffered from the statistically favored pattern. There were also choices that could shift the process into other patterns, choices
that could disrupt and thwart expectation. In other words, what looks routinized to the
scholar was not necessarily experienced as such. There was always cause for vigilance
and anxiety no matter how predictably things were going. In my search for regularity
I do not wish to lose sight of tactic, strategy, intelligence, stupidity, fear, anxiety, and
grand action.
"~be ~aga

of ~furring J!>roalbsson" (~art 1HJ)

We left Skrering riding in the company of Gudmund dyri, his kinsman, with thirty
hundreds in place of a hand. We next hear of Skrering in another saga where he again
provides the occasion for bigger men to confront each other. It is some eight years later
and Skrering is introduced as follows : "There was a cleric named Skrering, consecrated
as an acolyte. He was not very skilled at bearing weapons or in dressing himself - he
was one-handed. Some Norwegians had chopped it off at Gasar where Gudmund dyri
took up the case on his behalf." Clumsy though he may have been at getting clothes
on, he was not so bad at taking them off. Thus we learn that Skrering
had fathered a child on a woman whose brothers then sought out Kolbein to take
up their cause. [Skrering], in turn, sought out Bishop Gudmund to take his part.
Kolbein protested and said he would not accept the bishop's judgment in the case.
The bishop offered to pay six hundreds for the offense, claiming that that was
more than twice what they were entitled to. Kolbein refused the offer saying there
was no point in settling with the bishop because he broke every settlement
anyway.
Kolbein had Skrering outlawed, but the bishop put Kolbein along with all those
who had been involved in the judgment under interdict.
Nevertheless, two weeks later Kolbein and Sigurd [another chieftain opposed
to the bishop] held the court of confiscation for the outlawed cleric and took his
property.
When the bishop learned of this he excommunicated them both, because
Skrering's property had been assigned to him. (/slend. 20:246)
That was not the end of it. Kolbein and Sigurd prosecuted six of the bishop's household
members for aiding the outlawed Skrering. To make a long story short, matters continued to escalate until, in a pitched battle between Kolbein and the bishop's forces,
Kolbein was killed, struck in the head by a rock thrown by one of the bishop's men.
Kolbein's death was followed by aggressive action, culminating in an attack on the
bishop by a league of seven chieftains. I quote from the source at the point Amor,

sagas allow us to obserbe
people libing tbeir libes at barious
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~be

Kolbein's brother, had succeeded in surrounding some of the bishop's men in a church:
Arnor and his men went up to the church with their weapons drawn, urging those
who were inside and against whom they had the most cause to come out. If they
didn't, they said, they would attack them or starve them in the church.
Then Svein Jonsson spoke up. "I will come out on one condition."
They asked what it was.
"That you lop off my hands and feet before you chop off my head."
They accepted his terms.
He and the others then went out, because they did not want the church defiled
by them or their own blood. They came out unarmed. Svein was "limbed" as he
sang Ave Maria. He then stretched out his neck under the blow. His courage was
greatly praised.
Skrering the cleric also had his head chopped off there. (islend. 24:253)

onor, in
lar!Jd!' tOn!JfUtnt
tuitb man-tbtnin!J,
tbt comparin!J of
men. 11t tust mi!Jbt
bt tbat tbt btrp comparin!J of men, tbat is, bonor, tuitb
its inbtrtnt ambi!JUitits, was mucb
of tubat brobt tbt ftub, btarin!J
some kinb of causal relation to it.
~ .

Thus ends the "saga" of Skrering, a man who, at the very least, had an uncanny talent
for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. He is sagaworthy only because his haplessness provides the oGcasion for great action on the part of others. The loss of his
hand was a mere preliminary to an example of Gudmund dyri 's greatness; the bit of
pleasure he had with a woman, to his great misfortune, provided a point of articulation
for key events in the power struggle between the chieftain Kolbein and Bishop Gudmund; and the loss of his head was nothing more than an afterthought and anticlimax
to the incredible death of Svein Jonsson, a person about whom we know even less
than Skrering. Svein was a fearless warrior in a modified heroic style, newly affected,
it seems, by having heard or having read too much martyrology while serving the
bishop's cause. He would die without any expression of fear, but passively, concerned
not to defile the church, rather than actively, concerned to take down as many of his
enemy as God was willing to grant him. The sagas tend to be much more interested in
people like Svein than in people like Skrering. But I thought it appropriate to open this
work with Skrering as an example of the little people the sources do not make much of,
except to drag them on stage to suffer outrageous fortune. Skrering is a reminder that
the heroism of people like Svein Jonsson depended for its effect not only on the fact
that it imitated a model of heroic action from the past, but that it was distinguished in
the present from the behavior of people like Skrering, neither cowards nor heroes.
Without a Skrering, the actions of a Svein are deprived of their special meaning ....

jfrom

tbe ~ondubing $b~erbation~

While not all societies who value honor will feud, few which feud won't have honor
as a central cultural value. And in Iceland, at least, honor was largely congruent with
man-evening, the comparing of men. It just might be that the very comparing of men,
that is, honor, with its inherent ambiguities, was much of what drove the feud, bearing
some kind of causal relation to it. In any event, the nervous contradictions of demanding balance only to deny balance structured the meaning of a significant portion of
experience in the saga world.
Honor, however, was much subtler than we are inclined to think. Available to the
honorable person was an expansive range of practical activities, with more than enough
room available for sharp practice, tactic, and strategy. Honor was more than just the
pure heroic warrior ethic, although at root it still meant "don't tread on me." We are
talking about honor among farmers, who worried about their livestock, land, and
lawsuits. The particular content of honor was not the same in this setting as it was
on longships. Reputations inhered in one's skill in law, in the quality of one's land and
herds. Honor translated into practical advantage. It could even be practicality itself. It
meant good marriages for oneself and kin; it meant active involvement in a number of
exchange cycles with other people of honor, whether the exchanges were of gifts or of
insult and injury. Honor, above all, meant relations of reciprocity with other honorable
people. The life of honor could thus accommodate peace and peaceful resolution. This
is captured lexically by the extension in the plural of Old Icelandic sll!md, "honor,"
to mean "compensation payment." The word thus embodies an argument on behalf of
44

the honorableness of honorable monetary settlements, an argument that we know was
made. But we also know that the bloody counterargument was still available and more
than respectable in a wide range of settings. A person, after all, should not like to
"carry his kin in his purse," and any waiver of blood revenge could only be honorably
made if one was able to indicate one's future inviolability at the same time. It could be
said that honor is the ability to make others believe that you will indeed be tough the
next time, in spite of present discomfitures.
Rather than resume the substance of this book as its author, let me step back from
the work and react as a reader to the society depicted here. How do we respond to it
and how do we end up describing its essence? Was it violent? If so, was it more violent
than other cultures? Than ours, for instance? How can we possibly know; how can we
possibly measure violence anyway? Homicide rates, only the crudest of indicators at
best, are not recoverable in medieval Iceland, since we know neither the number of homicides nor the number of people. Homicide rates don't begin to capture the systematic
violence directed toward children, women, slaves; they don't take into account the fear
of violence. And none of these things are any more measurable now than they were
then. Should the measure of societal violence also take into account the acclimatization
that might inure people to violence? That pain might be something universal to the
human condition does not tell us if the same act causes the same amount of pain in
different times and in different places. How do we factor in saga Iceland, where,
apparently, verbal insult could cause somatic responses as painful as those caused by
physical assault, where words could hurt more than sticks or stones? Is such a culture
more violent because to the pain of blows we must add the pain of words? Or is it less
violent because some pain has its origin in mental rather than physical causes? If we
judge early Iceland violent, is it because the sagas appear so unembarrassed, so matter
of fact about acts that appall us? Or does it seem violent because the typical reader of
this book, like myself, couldn't endure the fear and anxiety we imagine we would feel
at the prospect of having no state to enforce our rights for us or to protect us from those
bent on enforcing their own? In other words, does their culture seem more violent because the responsibility for actually doing acts of violence was more evenly distributed
than it is now, there being no state agents to delegate the dirty work to or to claim a
monopoly on the dirty work? One reader of this book in draft offered the view that if
he had had doubts about the idea of progress in history before, they had just been dispelled. He was troubled by what he felt was the amorality of my account, the sympathy
he believed I felt for the people and their culture, a violent and anarchic society. In his
view, if this is what the minimalist state would tend toward, then that constituted a
refutation of the justifiability of the minimalist state.
But could we not also describe the culture as fairly stable with violence rather constrained or at least almost always constrainable to reasonable levels? There are still
scholars willing to accept a soft-on-feud view, which sees it as a " cohesive force" in
Black-Michaud's terms, or sees it as promoting nonviolent stability by being so replete
with conflict that conflict itself ends up in gridlock; this is the paradox of Gluckman's
"peace in the feud." There is also the discounting some readers will supply for the fact
that the legal and narrative sources used to construct this history would tend to be biased in favor of good stories, hence violent stories. We don't even have to discount that
much. The sagas do it for us, letting us know that the violence of feud was not a daily
occurrence (although we know next to nothing of violence within the household).
If we add up time and killings in these stories we find that the impression of excessive
violence is often a function of the compression of narrative time. The frequent saga
refrains of " nothing happened that year" or "everything was quiet for a time" condenses long periods of time into very few words, the time in which animals were
tended, hay was mowed, cloth was woven, etc. The sagas do not show people continually living with the anticipation of violence, rape, or expropriation that many American
urban dwellers must live with daily.
.....
How would a feminist react to early Iceland - a libertarian, a -~'•~
communitarian? I can't suppose to speak on their behalf, but I would
t
~
suspect that there is no reason why the Iceland I have painted
· ·~.Jir
oouldn't <qually disappoint and appeal to them without an~ ___ _ ,,-. fij..-::i_.,
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necessary correlation between the politics of the reader and the favor or disfavor they
might choose to bestow upon the culture. The saga world is mainly a world of men, but
women figure larger in it than they figure in many societies before or since. Jurally and
actually, they were less disabled than their continental counterparts of equivalent social
ranges. Above all, the sagas did not like weak women any more than they liked weak
men. Intelligence, health, beauty, and toughness were attributed in a surprisingly gender-neutral fashion in this literature. Virginity was a nonissue. The sagas did not put
women on pedestals. It was women who put men there and then goaded them into
maintaining their precarious stance aloft if they showed an inclination to descend.
What a refreshing relief to meet the women of the sagas after a lifetime of reading
of romantic heroines, or of Marys and Eves. But if Icelandic women may have had it
better than did their more degraded sisters on the continent, this, for some, is still no
reason to credit Icelandic society for such small favors. The world of the sagas was
enough of a man's world that I could not have adopted nonsexist pronouns without
seriously misrepresenting the reality I was trying to reconstruct. When I use the male
pronoun it means a man, not mankind. And one might suspect that among the class of
people the sagas are not especially interested in, the servants and the poor, the lot of
women was somewhat worse than the lot of the men, if only because the women had
more to fear from their male counterparts in the way of violence than the men did
from women.
Libertarians might have reason to be suspicious of a society that draws them like
a siren. Here they have a society with no coercive state seeking to redistribute wealth
or entitlements. Here rights are for the most part privately created and all are privately
enforced. But "private" enforcement does not mean much when there is no "public"
alternative for it to be compared to. Can the "private" as an analytic category exist unless it is paired with and distinguished from " public?" The very pairing itself is a part
of the history and theory of the state; it only makes sense in the context of the coercive
state. There was thus no "private" enforcement of rights in Iceland. There was simply
enforcement by people seeking aid from the various overlapping social solidarities they
could claim connection with. And none of these solidarities, except perhaps the chieftain-thingmen association, had as its central motive the enforcement of rights. Kin
groupings and household groupings were more complexly motivated. At the same time
there is a suggestion that the reason there is no state is because there is not enough
wealth to support it, not because, as some libertarians might suppose, of objections to
certain necessarily redistributive aspects of the state (cf. e.g., Nozick 1974). It is not
the have-nots, after all , who invented the state. The first steps toward state formation in
Iceland were made by churchmen, who had the model of the Roman church and Rome
itself available to them and by the big men intent on imitating Norwegian royal style.
Early state formation, I would guess, surely tended to involve redistributions, not
from rich to poor, however, but from poor to rich, from weak to strong.
People of communitarian tendencies also have reason to be attracted and repelled.
The attraction is the limited role of lordship, the active participation of large numbers
of free people (mostly men, but women too in a nontrivial way) in decision making
within and outside the household. The economy barely knew the existence of markets.
Social relations preceded economic relations. The nexus of household, kin, Thing,
even enmity, more than the nexus of cash, bound people to each other. The lack of extensive economic differentiation supported a weakly differentiated class system. And
if low societywide productivity meant some material deprivations, these deprivations
were more evenly distributed than they would be once state institutions also had
to be maintained . On the grimmer side, there were still startling disparities in access
to resources. Men were net beneficiaries of women's productive and reproductive
capabilities. In the Settlement Age the free could appropriate the labor and lives of
slaves. And if the juridical slave disappeared sometime in the twelfth century it can
hardly be said that the lot of later day laborers and vagabonds could have been much
better. If we were troubled some by measuring violence across time and space, how do
we measure things like quanta of misery? Was an impoverished Icelandic tenant any
better off than an Angevin serf of the eleventh and twelfth century? The Icelandic tenant seemed to endure a more ecologically and less socially imposed precariousness

than the Angevin serf. But do the same presumably pathetic average caloric intakes
mean something different when one is juridically free or when one is bound? The serf,
we may presume, suffered greater chagrin, akin to the torment of Tantalus, seeing
most of the fruits of his labors consumed by others within his sight and just beyond his
reach. We still think, intuitively, that there is something more immoral about starving
in a wealthy society than starving in a poor one. The serf also suffered more for the
feuding style of the counts and castellans. The Icelandic feuding style, at least until the
last decades of the commonwealth, and unlike its French analogue ... tended to spare
the productive units of the poor. But such small virtues have their costs too. Was the
benefit of a relatively (I must emphasize relatively) nonexploitive society bought at the
price of production levels so low that there was little to expropriate? To the extent that
answers depend on hard numerical data we will never know.
Those people committed to the rule of law will have to find in medieval Iceland an
interesting limiting case. The often unquestioned assumptions that law depends on the
state either for its existence or for its efficacy might have to be justified more fully. In
any event, theoretical musings on the origins of law and the state of nature might benefit from knowledge of this remarkable instance of social and legal form in the absence
of a coercive state. Law in Iceland was pervasive, complex, purported to be regular
and uniform in application over the ranges it claimed for itself. Although some of the
claims sounded rather hollow, as when it purported to prohibit out-of-court settlements
in serious cases unless leave to settle had previously been granted by the Logretta
(Gragas Ia 174, II 371), it still recognized its limits in the face of blood revenge, which
it countenanced within fairly generous limits. The limits of law might well have been
clearer to these people than they are to us, because they would not have been tempted
to confuse the category of law with the category of the state and not because there is
any necessary reason why law as law should be more limited without the state than
with it. And could it be that the prospects for law's legitimacy were better in this
minimal setting because law might have been perceived as less a"vehicle for enforcing
the interests of those whose particular interests the state primarily advanced? Did the
powerful in Iceland control law in the same way that they control it in state settings?
Or are the mechanisms of dominance as regards law substantially different? Whatever
the limits of Icelandic law, and despite the lack of state enforcement, we have seen that
people learned law, cared to have it on their side, used the legal forums, and bargained
in the law's shadow. The Icelandic example reveals the force of law as a legitimating
entity in a society in which legitimacy was something that was not firmly fixed or
complacently assumed.
Incurable romantics might find saga Iceland to have a kind of gruff quaintness that
is not without considerable charm. I must admit I fear the undermining of my critical
sensibility by the attractiveness of the saga style, with its ability to imbue homely action with a sense of the heroic, with its ability to praise imperceptibly and hence subtly
the honorable life well lived. Many of the men and women I admire - Skarphedin,
Egil, Bergthora, Hallgerd, Hvamm-Sturla, his son Sighvat - I must remind myself
probably would make worse company in life than they do in books where their dullnesses are suppressed and their excesses mediated by the considerable skills of the saga
writer. A significant portion of their charm is their absence, their distance in time. The
people I have named were all intelligent and witty, but Skarphedin, even when properly
behaved as indeed he usually was, inspired uneasiness in his closest friends, and Egil,
great poet that he was, was also something of a psychopath. While a modern might
find some cause for nervous laughter in his purposefully vomiting on the face of a niggardly host, if not in his gouging out the unfortunate man's eye a few hours later, the
fact is that this was the kind of a man whom anyone ending up in academia was unlikely to seek the opportunity to socialize with. My own romantic propensities are well
checked by a firm belief that it would have been my luck to have lived as poor Skrering
Hroaldsson did: . . . a minor cleric, for a while without hand, and finally without head .
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